

## Attachment C

# Exhibit 4

SSCI# 2005 3590

~~TOP SECRET//HCS//SI G//ORCON,NOFORN//MR~~

September 1, 2005

Honorable Pat Roberts  
 Chairman  
 Select Committee on Intelligence  
 United States Senate  
 Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

~~(S)~~ The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004, Classified Annex S. 1025/S. Report 108-44, required the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to submit a joint FBI-CIA intelligence report assessing the nature and extent of Saudi Government support of terrorism [REDACTED]

(U) Pursuant to the above, enclosed please find this report.

Sincerely,

Sincerely,

Robert S. Mueller III  
 Director  
 Federal Bureau of Investigation

Porter J. Goss  
 Director  
 Central Intelligence Agency

Enclosure

(1) Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV  
 Vice Chairman  
 Select Committee on Intelligence  
 United States Senate  
 Washington, D.C. 20510

~~DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED~~  
~~SECRET WHEN DETACHED~~  
~~FROM TOP SECRET~~  
~~ENCLOSURE~~

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**(U) Executive Summary**

~~(S//NF)~~ Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has been working to assess Saudi Arabia's ties to terrorism, including the 2001 terrorist acts, in order to address questions arising about the country's support for organizations that may have provided support for previous al-Qa'ida attacks. Our assessment to date is as follows:

- There is no evidence that either the Saudi Government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.
- There is evidence that official Saudi entities, [REDACTED] and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.
- The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.
- [REDACTED] Saudi-funded clerics have been found to be [REDACTED] Saudi-Americans and other communities in the United States.
- [REDACTED] in the United States, including diplomats, are engaged in a campaign to influence public perception and policy.
- The Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi<sup>1</sup> sect of Sunni Islam in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect's beliefs to justify their actions.
- There is no information to indicate that either Omar al-Bayoumi or Osama Basnan materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.

~~(S//NF)~~ Recent cooperation between Saudi intelligence and the USIC is largely driven by the Saudi royal family's recognition of the domestic threat posed to it by al-Qa'ida following several bombings by the group inside Saudi Arabia, starting in May 2003.

- In the past, the Saudi Government found itself in a precarious position, on the one hand it was denouncing al-Qa'ida as a threat, yet on the other hand it was underestimating al-Qa'ida's vitality within the Kingdom and treating the group with special consideration. Raids by the General Directorate for Investigations (Mabahith) following the attacks in May 2003, which have resulted in the death or arrest of al-Qa'ida members in Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how this policy has changed.

<sup>1</sup> Salafism is a strict form of Sunni Islam that rejects modern commentary and interpretation of the Koran. Wahhabism is the Arabian variant of Salafism, and has many variants in Saudi Arabia. The founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, formed a symbiotic relationship with the Saudi Royal Family that continues to have a profound effect on the Saudi monarchy. (U)

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COLLABORATIVE  
**Intelligence**  
ASSESSMENT

**Assessment of Saudi Arabian  
Support to Terrorism and the  
Counterintelligence Threat to the  
United States**



Joint Intelligence Report  
Prepared by

**December 2004**

Federal Bureau of  
Investigation

Central Intelligence  
Agency



[REDACTED]

## **Assessment of Saudi Arabian Support to Terrorism and the Counterintelligence Threat to the United States**

### **Scope Note**

This is a joint FBI-CIA intelligence report as prescribed by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the FY 2004 Classified Annex S.1025/S. Report 108-44. This report provides the intelligence oversight committees with an assessment of the nature and extent of Saudi Government support of terrorism as well as the Saudi intelligence threat to the United States. In addition, this report [REDACTED] (O-1)

(O-1)

This assessment was prepared by the FBI and CIA. Comments and queries may be addressed to the FBI, attention Deputy Assistant Director [REDACTED] (P) Counterterrorism Analysis Branch, at [REDACTED] (S) or Section Chief [REDACTED] (P) Counterintelligence Analysis Section, at [REDACTED] (P) or to the CIA, Chief, Middle East North Africa Branch in the Counterterrorist Center, at [REDACTED] (O-1)

## Executive Summary

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) has been working to assess Saudi Arabia's ties to terrorism, including the 2001 terrorist acts, in order to address questions arising about the country's support for organizations that may have provided support for previous al-Qa'ida attacks. Our assessment to date is as follows:

- There is no evidence that either the Saudi Government or members of the Saudi royal family knowingly provided support for the attacks of 11 September 2001 or that they had foreknowledge of terrorist operations in the Kingdom or elsewhere.
- There is evidence that official Saudi entities, chiefly the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and associated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), provide financial and logistical support to individuals in the United States and around the world, some of whom are associated with terrorism-related activity.
- The Saudi Government and many of its agencies have been infiltrated and exploited by individuals associated with or sympathetic to al-Qa'ida.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees appear to be engaged in collecting intelligence in the United States. Saudi-funded clerics have been found to be collecting on Saudi-Americans and other communities in the United States.
- Suspected Saudi intelligence officers and cooptees in the United States, including diplomats, are engaged in a campaign to influence public perception and policy.
- The Saudi Government and private Saudi individuals support the propagation of the conservative Wahhabi-Salafi sect of Sunni Islam in the United States. Jihadists adhere to and interpret this sect's beliefs to justify their actions.
- There is no information to indicate that either Omar al-Bayoumi or Osama Bin Laden materially supported the hijackers wittingly, were intelligence officers of the Saudi Government or provided material support for the 11 September attacks, contrary to media speculation.

Recent cooperation between Saudi intelligence and the USIC is largely driven by the Saudi royal family's recognition of the domestic threat posed to it by al-Qa'ida following several bombings by the group inside Saudi Arabia, starting in May 2003.

- In the past, the Saudi Government found itself in a precarious position, on the one hand it was denouncing al-Qa'ida as a threat, yet on the other hand it was underestimating al-Qa'ida's vitality within the Kingdom and treating the group with special consideration. Recent raids by the General Directorate for Investigations (Mabahith), which have resulted in the death or arrest of al-Qa'ida members in Saudi Arabia, demonstrate how this policy has changed.